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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 




ELMO L. HARRIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 9564 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
There are some additional matters which 
plaintiff feels should be added 'to defendant's State-
ment of Fact. With respect to the entering of the 
judgment of $4500.00, this miatter was entered 
upon a stipulation between plaintiff and defendant 
in open court. The testimony of the parties and their 
counsel is as follows: (R. 21) 
"THE COURT: There is no question I take 
it that the sum of forty-six five, that is, 
$4,605 would be due and owing if this decree 
isn't modified. 
"MR. IVERSON: I think that is approxi-
mately right. There wouldn't be but two or 
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three matters that Mr. Harris says have 
been omitted from her accounting. 
"THE COURT: Well, I imagine Mr. Mc-
Cullough would take $4'500 and wouldn't fuss. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: We will accept 
forty-five hundred. Is that agreeable? 
"'THE COUR'T : Do you? 
'"MR. IVERSON: Yes, we will stipulate that 
if she is entitled to judgment, that she is en-
titled to $4500.00." 
With respect to the court's statement at R. 60 
of the record in holding the defendant in contempt, 
the court stated: 
"THE COURT: I don't care anything about 
this borrowing. The defendant is in contempt 
since he's been working at Sperry's by -
"MR. IVERSON: If Your Honor please-
" THE COURT: -sixty dollars instead of 
the one hundred, and whether he 'borrowed 
at other times I wouldn't be interested." 
At the time the decree of divorce was entered 
( R. 24) the defendant was out of work, had no 
money, and was suffering from a double hernia 
and could not do heavy work. Yet the court in enter-
ing the decree of divorce on the lOth of February, 
1956, by the Honorable Parley S. Norseth (R. 9) 
ordered the defendant to pay to plaintiff for the 
support and maintenance of the children the sum 
of $50.00 per month per child. 
With respeet to the $1,500 loan which defendant 
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claims he borrowed from his sister and is paying 
back at the rate of $10.00 per month, it is interest-
ing to note the defendant's testimony at pageR. 28 
of the record: 
"Q. By the way, where did you get the fif-
teen hundred dollars to invest? 
"A. I borrowed it from my sister. 
"Q. What is her name? 
"A. Donna Petty. 
"Q. How much of it have you repaid? 
"A. I haven't !any of it repaid yet." 
With respect to defendant's earnings and take-
home pay, at R. 28 of the record, he testified: 
"Q. Now, what is your present take-home 
pay? 
"A. It averages around sixty-eight dollars 
a week or around three hundred a month 
practically you could say take-home pay. 
"Q. That is approximately three hundred 
dollars a month. Now, during all this time 
that you were out of work, what did you do 
for money? 
"A. I had to depend on my sister, I guess. 
Defendant testified with respect to his expenses 
per month (R. 30 and 31) rent $71.00, groceries 
$60.00, utilities including telephone and electric 
power $16.00, clothing '$10.00, b!arber $5.00, launder-
ing and cleaning $8.00; that with respect to trans-
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portation, he uses his wife's automobile which she 
purchased solely from her own funds, but that he 
maintains it a:t an expense of from $35.00 to $40.00 
per month. 
With respect to the money which defendant 
claims to have paid the plaintiff for the support 
of the children, the defendant cl·aims $60.00 per 
month since working at Sperry, plus $10.00 "that 
he spends on the children." At page 32 of the record 
the defendant states: 
''A. She's loaned me the money to go and 
get them fixed because I haven't been able to 
save enough outside of my living conditions 
and paying her sixty ra month and spending 
ten on the kids, seventy, I had my hands full. 
I couldn't do it." 
With respect to the amount of money the de-
fendant gives or spends on the children, the defend-
ant testified: ( R. 32-3'3) 
"Q. Now, what moneys have you given to 
the children, or how often do you give them 
moneys and what-
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to that, 
Your Honor. I think it is irrelevant what he 
gives to the kiddies. 
THE COURT: The objection is sus-
tained. He may be charitable, but this court 
is not interested in his charity. It is only in-
terested in whether he is abiding by the order 
of the court. 
"Q. Did you have occasion to purchase a 
bicycle for the boy sometime ago? 
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MR. McCULLOUGH: Object to it-
"A. y . es, sir. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: -Your Honor. 
"Q. Wait just a minute. 
·THE COURT: The answer will be 
stricken. the objection is sustained. 
With respect to the affirmative defense of es-
toppel raised by the defendant, the defendant testi-
fied that he had a ·conversation with the plaintiff 
in June, July or August of 1956, and defendant 
testified as follows: ( R. 35-38) 
"A. It was around in August of the same 
year. 
"Q. All right, August of 1956? 
"A. June, July or August. 
"Q. Do you recall the first conversation 
where you were and where she was? 
"A. Well, she lived in the apartments there 
on First South. I forget the name of them now. 
"Q. Is that where the conversation was had? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And this would be in August in the 
apartment that she was living in? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Do you remember the street that it was 
on? 
"A. First South between Fourth and - I 
forget the name of the apartments now. First 
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South and Fourth East, somewhere in there. 
"Q. All right, tell us what she said and what 
you said. 
"A. She just said that she knew I had been 
out of work and to give her whatever I could, 
any little amount would help, and that she 
was working now, and every little bit I sent 
her would help a lot, and I would try and 
give her as much as I could. 
"Q. Well, what else was said? Was there 
'anything said about the- what you told us 
about before, Mr. Robbins? 
"A. Was that 'before Mr. Robbins or after? 
"Q. I am asking you. 
"A. Oh, she said she would sure like me to 
keep these creditors off her 'back, so that she 
wouldn't have no trouble with her work, and 
she would be perfectly happy to accept what-
ever I could afford as long as I kept these 
creditors away from her place of business, 
because she said she would get fired if they 
came around there garnisheeing her wages. 
"Q. Had she already been garnisheed? 
"A. One week there she had. 
* * * * 
"Q. Is that the first time you had the con-
versation over this matter that you keep these 
creditors off her back? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
* * * * 
"Q. All right, now, h'ave you since this first 
conversation that you told us about had any 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
further conversations concerning the matter 
of your relationships in regard to the payment 
of the support money for the children with 
your wife? 
"A. No, I have had happy relations up until 
this month. I thought she was satisfied the 
way things were going." 
During the last ye1ar and a half prior to the 
hearing, the defendant testified that he had been 
paying the sum of $70.00 per month to the plaintiff 
for the support and maintenance of the children. 
( R. 38, 39) Defendant testified at R. a9 of the 
record that he had been married two years in Aug-
ust of 1961; that at the time he was married they 
had no furniture; that since they married they have 
acquired some and that his wife had paid for all 
of it. Defendant further testified that he felt the 
maximum he could pay for the support of the child-
ren was the sum of $70.00 per month. (R. 40) Based 
upon the one conversation which the defendant 
claims to have had with the plaintiff with respect 
to his defense of estoppel, the defendant testified 
as R. 42: 
"Q. Now, if your wife had not told you that 
she would be satisfied if you paid the credit-
ors and kept them satisfied and ~as much as 
you could possibly afford, what would you 
have done, Mr. Harris? 
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to that-
" A. I would have -
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MR. McCULLOUGH: -as irrelevant, 
immaterial, incompetent, Your Honor. He 
knew what the order of the court was. 
THE COURT: I will let him say. Go 
~ahead. 
"A. I would have got hold of an attorney 
and had it reduced to what I could pay, If 
I didn't think she was happy with the set-up." 
With respect to defendant's living expenses, 
on cross-examination the defendant testified at R. 
46: 
"Q. Now, you say you spend seventy-one 
dollars for rent. Is that correct? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
''Q. Is tha:t the full amount of the rent for 
your apartment? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Your wife doesn't pay any portion of 
that? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. You spend sixty dollars a month for 
food? 
"A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. Does your wife pay any portion of that? 
"A. She buys things from time to time." 
With respect to defendant's defense of estoppel, 
the plaintiff testified at R. 52 of the record: 
"Q. Mrs. Harris, have you ever at any time 
since the entering of the decree of divorce, 
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either orally or in writing or in any manner, 
told your husband or your former husband or 
indicated to him that he did not have to pay 
the full amount of the money set forth in the 
decree? 
"A. No. In fact, I have asked him to the con-
trary. I have 'always asked for more." 
The home in which the plaintiff lives was pur-
chased by the plaintiff, her sister, and her mother, 
and stands in the name of all three. (R. 54) How-
ever, the sister does not live with them any longer. 
(R. 53, 54) 
With respect to the earnings of plaintiff's son, 
the plaintiff testified at R. 55: 
"Q. And how much does the boy e!arn on his 
paper route? 
"A. This last month he earned eight dollars. 
Some months he earns fourteen, and the high-
est he's ever earned was twenty-eight dollars. 
"Q. What would he average, about twenty 
dollars a month? 
"A. I would say so." 
With respect to the pl1aintiff's expenses per 
month, the plaintiff testified at R. 55: 
"Q. · Now, taking out what your sister has 
heretofore been paying you, there's four hun-
dred thirty-five dollars a month. Can't you 
live on four hundred thirty-five dollars 'a 
month and feed the two children and your 
mother and yourself in that home? 
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"A. Well, I could if I had that coming in. 
We have had repairs on the house. We bought 
an old home, and we have had appliances go 
out. We lrave got to have it painted now, and 
my children both of them need an orthodontist 
right now at the present time, and that is what 
I really need money for now, and I have got 
a boy with hay fever, and he is suffering so 
'bad I have got to take him and have ~a series 
of shots, which are very expensive from the 
doctor, and the children are costing a lot more 
now than they -
Further at R. 57: 
''Q. Tell us what besides board and room 
you have to supply the children. 
"A. My boy has two front teeth broken half 
way off. They both have got to be repaired, 
and it is about a hundred dollars for each 
one of those. 
"A. All right. 
"A. And my daughter has got to go to an 
orthodontist or have surgery on her molars 
that I couldn't take care of at the time I 
should have, and it is going to cost me a tre-
mendous amount of money to get that taken 
care of now. I don't know how much, but I 
know it is going to be over two hundred dol-
lars 
"Q. All right. What ordinary, constantly re-
curring expenses do you have besides food 
and shelter. 
"A. I have doctor bills. I h1a ve - the child-
ren - my boy belongs to the Boy Scouts. It 
10 
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just cost me twelve dollars last month. He 
has to pay those dues, and I have to keep them 
clothed. I don't know all what you mean, but 
I don't have enough money to take care of 
them for the things that they need at the pre-
sent time." 
Further wirth respect to the defense of the de-
fendant with respect to estoppel, the plaintiff te1sti-
fied at R. 58 : 
"Q. And you had no conversation at all with 
him about him taking care of these obligations 
on which you were jointly liable and that as 
long as he paid what he could for the children 
you would be satisfied? 
''A. No, I never said that. 
"Q. You never said ;anything like that? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Have you ever told that to his sister? 
"A. No, sir. 
"Q. Do you know his sister? 
''A. Yes, I know his siter. 
"Q. She's loaned him money on various oc-
casions to help keep the family when he hasn't 
had enough, hasn't she? 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Object to it as 
irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: If the witness knows, 
she may answer. 
"Q. Do you know whether his sister has loan-
11 
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ed money to him for the support of the family 
when he's been out of work? 
"A. Not for the support of his family, no, 
never. 
''Q. What was the money for? 
"A. When he had an invention and was to 
get a patent for an invention of his, she loan-
ed some money. 
Further on page 59: 
'·'Q. I see. But at le'ast you have taken no 
a~tion of any kind against Mr. Harris to col-
lect anything more than the amounts that he 
has been paying to you up until the last thirty 
days? 
''A. I have :asked him every time I have seen 
him that I need more money. 
~'Q. But you have done nothing about any 
action. Is that correct? 
"A. He keeps promising that he will do it, 
and I never have until it came-" 
The lower court found as set forth in the Find-
ings of Fact '(R. 66): 
"4. That during the period of said de-
linquency the plaintiff made constant andre-
peated demands upon defendant to make said 
support money payments; that defendant fail-
ed and refused to make the payments as set 
forth in the order of the court dated the 1Oth 
of February, 1956." 
12 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTER-
ING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND 
AGA:INST THE 'DE'FENDANT FOR $41500. FURTHER, 
THE TRIAL COURT 'DID NOT MISAPPLY THE LAW 
APPL1I'CABLE TO SAID 1POINT IN I'SSUE. 
As set forth in plaintiff's Statement of Facts, 
the sum of $4500 was agreed to by plaintiff and de-
fendant in open court as the sum that judgment 
would be rendered for, if plaintiff was in fact en-
titled to judgment. Defendant's main contention is 
that the plaintiff was estopped to claim said judg-
ment by reason of her actions. Plaintiff has set 
forth the testimony in full of the defendant with 
respect to what he claimed were the grounds for 
estoppel, and plaintiff refers the court to p11aintiff's 
Statement of Fact. It should be remembered, how-
ever, that according to the defendant's own testi-
mony there was but one conversation with the plain-
tiff with respect to these grounds for estoppel, and 
that was in June, July or August of 19S6, and de-
fendant's testimony was as follows: 
"She just said that she knew I had been out 
of work and to give her whatever I could, any 
little amount would help, and that she was 
working now, and every 'bit I sent her would 
help a lot, and I would try and give her as 
much as I could.'' 
Further, "Oh, she said she would sure like me 
13 
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to keep these creditors off her back so that 
she wouldn't have no trouble with her work, 
·and she would 'be perfectly happy to accept 
whatever I could afford as long as I kept these 
creditors away from her place of business 
because she said she would get fired if they 
came around there garnisheeing her wages." 
Further, ''Is that the first time you had the 
conversations over this matter - that you 
keep the creditors off her back?" 
''A. Yes, sir'' 
Further, "All right, now have you since this 
first conversation that you told us about had 
any further conversations concerning the mat-
ter of your relationships in regard to the pay-
ment of the support money for -your children 
with your wife? 
"A. No, I have had happy relations up until 
this month. I thought she was satisfied the 
way things were going." 
This is the only conversation which the defend-
ant testified to by his own words in which anything 
was mentioned to the plaintiff with respect to his 
grounds for estoppel. Even as to this one conversa-
tion, the plaintiff denied ever having such a conver-
sation 1and that her total conversation with the de-
fendant at all times was "'I need more money, can't 
you give me something more?" or words to this 
effect. 
Until the defendant was employed at the Sperry 
Rand job, his employment was spasmodic and he 
was unable to maintain employment because of his 
14 
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physical condition, which physical condition by the 
defendant's own testimony existed at the time the 
decree of divorce was entered. The trial court clearly 
believed the evidence as submitted 'by the plaintiff 
and without question did not believe the evidence 
testified to 'by defendant. The trial court found, as 
set forth in its Findings of 'Fact, that during the 
period of the delinquency plaintiff made constant, 
repeated demands upon defendant to make said 
support money payments. Under the doctrine re-
cited in the case of Price vs. Price, 4 Utah '2d '153, 
289 P. 2d 1044, this court held that if there was evi-
dence adduced at the trial which it 'believed would 
support the trial court's 1award, then the judgment 
of the lower court could not be disturbed on appeal. 
It is interesting to note the comment of the court 
at page 154 of the Utah Reports: 
"As to 1): Defendant recites facts testified 
to by him which he apparently assumes the 
court was required to consider as true, but it 
is obvious from the trial court's conclusion 
that the latter did not believe everything de-
fendant said. Other evidence adduced, if be-
lieved, would support the award, and under 
familiar principles we cannot disturb the 
judgment in such event." 
Further, defendant seems to take great comfort 
in the fact that while he was flitting from job to 
job and unable to hold employment because of his 
"physical condition" the fact that plaintiff did not 
15 
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harass him was a conclusive presumption that the 
plaintiff waived her rights. Accordingly, the plaina 
tiff is barred from recovering against defendant 'bea 
cause of her actions. This court in the case of Open-
shaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 57~4, 1'44 P. 2d 528 
at page 579 of the 'Utah reports states: 
"But mere inaction or delay short of the period 
of limitations, in the enforcement of payment 
of an obligation !already accrued, without 
more, is insufficient upon which to predicate 
laches. 
" 'Laches is more than mere lapse of time; its 
essence is estoppel.' De Giovacchini v. Teich, 
133 N. J. Eq. 107, 30 A. 2d 815, 819. As 
stated by this court in Burningham v. Burke 
et al, 67 Utah 90, at page 107, 245 P. 977, at 
page 983, 46 A.L.R. 446: 'While delay is an 
important factor, yet mere delay, unless una 
reasonable or inexcusable, is not enough; and 
of equal importance are the circumstances 
occurring during the delay, the relation of 
the parties to the subject, dis!advantages that 
may have come through loss of evidence, 
change of title, intervention of equities, or in-
jury from other causes.' 
"In this case we have searched the record 
in vain for any evidence which would even 
tend to show that plaintiff misled defendant 
to his detriment, or in any other way did any-
thing to injure defendant, make it difficult 
or impossible for him to comply with the order 
of the court, or persuaded him not to apply to 
the court for reduction of the award. The evi-
dence adduced to the effect that on the few 
occasions when he visited the children and 
16 
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their mother in California, the plaintiff did 
not harass him for payment or arrearages, 
is not sufficient upon which to conclude that 
she was guilty of laches. * * * * 
"Nor does he show how he has been injured 
by her acting on the mistaken belief so in-
duced, nor why he should in equity profit by 
his conduct in making the niggardly contri-
bution to her support of approximately $9.50 
per month for the five years preceding the 
hearing - the amount arrived at by giving 
full credence to his own testimony as to such 
payments. 
"'* * * laches cannot 'be imputed to one who 
was ignorant of the facts and for that reason 
failed to assert his rights, !and on such 
ground, to bar relief against fraud, laches 
must not only consist of delay but of a delay 
which worked a disadvantage to the opposing 
party.' Burningham v. Burke, supra. 
"The evidence was clearly insufficient to sup-
port the finding or justify the conclusion, 
whichever it may be design a ted, of laches. 
"The cases cited by respondent to the effect 
that laches for m'any years may constitute 
a defense to contempt proceedings are no 
authority for his contention that the failure 
of an aggrieved party to immediately enforce 
payment of an a ward of alimony and support 
money may be treated as laches.'' 
Because of defendant's poor '''physical condi-
tion" the plain tiff has of necessity been required to 
seek employment, which she did immediately after 
the divorce decree in order to support herself and 
17 
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the two minor children. As shown by her testimony 
and her repeated demands upon the plaintiff she 
has constantly been after the defendant to make ad-
di tion~al payments and to bring the payments to date. 
As shown by the plaintiff's testimony, the children 
themselves, because of the failure of defendant to 
make his payments, have suffered by not having the 
proper dental care for their teeth at the time when 
they should have been cared for. The court only 
has to read the testimony of the pl'aintiff in this 
regard to fully understand that because the children 
were not receiving the full amount they had to fore-
go the necessary den tal repairs they needed. 
It is true the plaintiff has not brought a court 
action to secure 'judgment for the delinquency prior 
to the instant hearing and the defendant seems to 
take great comfort in the fact that if the plaintiff 
had wanted the back money that she would have 
proceeded with the matter in court. A slight perusal 
of the defendant's own testimony with respect to his 
earning capacity in the past is indicative of how 
futile a court action at such time would have been. 
Certainly the defendant cannot say that the plain-
tiff has waived her rights by failing to bring 'a court 
action. By Plaintiff's own testimony it is apparent 
that the plaintiff could not waive this right of the 
children's support when the children were so defini-
tely in need of that support. Defendant's biggest 
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argument is to the effect that since the plaintiff is 
working and has been since shortly after the decree 
of divorce, that he should no longer be required to 
comply with the court's order and pay the $100.00 
per month for the support of the children, regard-
less of whether they need it or not. If defendant's 
contention in this regard is to be accepted, then any 
divorced father can m'erely sit by until his former 
wife obtains employment, and then come into court 
and say, look my former wife is now working, 
therefore, the support payments for the children 
should be reduced or entirely eliminated 'as to any-
thing tlrat I have not paid in the past. The defend-
ant's argument is totally without logic. 
Defendant quotes from the case of Larsen v. 
Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P. 2d 596 for the prop-
osition that since defendant testified with respect 
to his grounds for estoppel, even though not be-
lieved hy the lower court, that he is now under the 
doctrine of the Larsen case relieved of the obliga-
tion of any accrued 'arrear ages. It should be noted 
that the court in this case specifically found that 
the evidence was sufficient to support findings for 
either party on issue of plaintiff's laches, acquies-
ance, and equitable estoppel following her recovery. 
Therefore, the court remanded it to the trial court 
for 'a specific finding with respect to said issue. 
The lower court in the instant case has specifically 
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found in its Finding of Fact (R. 66): "That during 
the period of said delinquency, the plaintiff made 
constant and repeated demands upon defendant to 
make said support money payments, and that de-
fendant failed and refused to make the payments 
a.Js set forth 'by the order of the court dated Novem-
ber 10, 1956." And again with respect to defend-
ant's grounds for estoppel, the court should speci-
fically examine the testimony of the one conver-
sation upon which defendant bases his grounds for 
estoppel as set forth in the Statement of Fact by 
plaintiff. The facts of the Larsen case are entirely 
different than those in the instant case; therefore, 
said case would have no bearing upon the decision 
in this case. 
In what way has the defendant changed his 
position in order to invoke the doctrine of estoppel? 
He was ordered to pay the bills as set forth in the 
decree of the court, some of which he paid and some 
of which he did not pay. And he was ordered to 
make monthly payments to the plaintiff, a portion 
of which he has paid and the majority of which 
he has not paid. 
POINT 2. 
THE TRIA'L COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
TO PER'MIT THE SIS'TER OF THE DEFENDANT, 
DONNA PETTY, TO TESTIFY. 
·with respect to Po'in t 2 of the defendant's 
argument, the defendant set forth in full and the 
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plaintiff has repeated defendant's statement in her 
Statement of Fact, the one conversation upon which 
he claims to rely for ·his grounds of estoppel. Cer-
tainly the sister of the defendant could not elabor-
ate beyond that particular statement. The matters 
as set forth in Point 1 of plaintiff's brief are equally 
applicable to Point 2. 
POINT 3. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FTNDING DE-FEND-
ANT GUILTY OF CONTE'MPT FOR H1S FAILURE 
TO MAKE THE FULL PAYMENT SINCE HIS EM-
PLOYMENT AT S'PERRYS. 
The defendant has taken great pains in his 
brief to show that although he h!as only paid the 
plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per month, that in reality 
he has been paying her in full because, as he states, 
he was spending $10.00 a month on the children 
and, in addition, the plaintiff took the children as 
dependents on her income tax return, which gave 
her another $20.00 or '$'2'1.00 per month. And, fur-
ther, that the defendant has maintained since his 
employment at Sperrys medical insurance to cover 
the medical expenses of the children. The re1asoning 
of the defendant in these respects no matter how 
commendable it may or may not be certainly 'is not 
complying with the order of the court as set forth in 
the decree of divorce. The decree did not authorize 
the defendant to enter into these alternative pro-
grams, but made ~a specific requirement that the 
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defendant pay the sum of $100.00 per month, which 
he has not done and has failed and refused to do. 
Further, the defendant in setting up his monthly 
expenses, pays the entire rent for the apartment for 
both himself and his present wife although she is 
working. Secondly, he buys the groceries for the 
sum of $60.00 per month. When asked if his present 
wife paid any portion of the groceries, his statement 
was that "she buys things from time to time". Fur-
ther, the defendant set forth that he is obligated to 
spend $8.00 for laundry, $'5.00 for a barber, $10.00 
for clothes, $'35.00 or $40.00 per month for an 1auto-
mobile that he doesn't own. Further that they have 
accumulated furniture since he married his pres~nt 
wife although he has never paid for any portion of 
it; they have accumulated !an automobile however he 
didn't pay anything with respect to the automobile; 
that his present wife has made all of the payments 
in that respect. And then again he says he can only 
pay $60.00 per month because he has to spend $10.00 
per month on the children. Here again this is not the 
defendant coming into court with clean hands to 
show good cause why he has not complied with the 
order of the court, 'but rather ~a defendant trying to 
rationalize his expenses so as to justify the amount 
which he wants to pay for the support of the niinor 
children. 
With respect to defendant's contention that he 
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will lose his job if he is required to spend thirty days 
in jail. Certainly the plaintiff is not desirous that 
the defendant lose his employment. It has taken him 
since 19156 to the present time to dbtain employment 
whereby he could in some ha:lf measure comply with 
the order of the court and attempt to support his 
minor children. The plaintiff does not want him to 
lose his job. However, the defendant has got to be 
made to realize the necessity of complying with the 
court's order and to give his children the support 
they are entitled to and which he can afford to pay. 
POINT 4. 
THE TRIAL COURT 'DID NOT ABUSE ITS DIS-
CRETION IN COMMrTTING THE DEFENDANT TO 
JAIL FOR THIRTY DAYS. 
No argument is necessary with respe~t to Point 
4 of defendant's brief. 
POTNT 5. 
'THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
THE DIVORCE DECREE TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT 
OF SUPPORT MONEY 1PAYABLE BY THE DEFEND-
ANT TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The defendant proved no material change in 
circumstance the entering of the divorce decree. 
Pursuant to the facts, it was clearly brought out 
that defendant, at the time the decree was entered, 
was unemployed and was still ordered to pay the 
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sum of $50.00 per month per child. Since that time 
the defendant's position has been bettered measur-
ably. He is now steadily employed earning a net 
take-home pay of $300.00 per month. The defend-
~ant's contention that since the plaintiff is now work-
ing therefore the defendant does not need to sup-
port the cnildren to the extent that he was required 
to do so when he was totally unemployed is with-
out merit. The needs of the children as illustrated 
by the plaintiff are adequately set forth in the State-
ment of Fact of the plaintiff !and will not be dupli-
cated here. However, the court's attention should 
be called to such statements of the plaintiff and the 
immediate needs of the minor children for dental 
care, clothing, and the social needs of the children 
~as set forth by the plaintiff. 
'Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judg-
ment and order of the ·Third District Coutt should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff -Respondent 
304 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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